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Abstract 
 
  
We empirically assess how both between-country inequality and within-
country inequality relate to climate policy ambition as defined by NDC 
pledges of the Paris Agreement (COP21). We exploit the difference between 
high and low ambition targets submitted by parties to construct a climate 
policy ambition index. We find that both inequalities shape countries’ 
pledges: First, low income countries tend to be more ambitious in setting 
their pledges when external support is received. Second, within-country 
inequality is associated with (i) lower mitigation ambition in low and middle-
low-income countries, and with (ii) higher mitigation ambition, although none 
statistically significant, for upper-high and high-income countries. Despite we 
cannot claim any causal mechanism, our results are discussed in terms of 
climate policy being a superior good in rich countries and elites benefiting 
from emitting economic activities in poorer countries 
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1. Introduction  
The Paris Agreement, reached in 2015, is widely considered to be one of the most 
important milestones in global climate policy: 195 very different countries, facing very 
different pressures within their borders and very different responsibilities as regards climate 
change and its impacts, committed themselves to keeping the global temperature rise this 
century well below 2 ºC. Each country submitted a nationally determined pledge, or 
nationally determined contribution (NDC), to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 
2030. Importantly, most countries submitted two NDCs, one of them more ambitious than 
the other, conditional on their receiving external support (financial, technological and/or 
capacity building) from other countries. Against this backdrop, the main objective of this 
paper is to analyze how cross-country income differences, as well as within-country income 
inequality, shape the climate policy ambition of these 195 countries. 
The relationship between income inequality and environmental deterioration has been 
previously addressed by several studies with somewhat contradictory conclusions, as is 
evident in the literature review conducted by Berthe and Elie (2015). From a theoretical 
point of view, we find, on the one hand, a stream of literature based on the economic 
behavior of households. For example, Scruggs (1998) and Heerink, Mulatu and Bulte 
(2001) consider environmental quality a superior good, so that demand for environmental 
protection grows as income increases. In this context, more affluent households, it is 
claimed, are more willing to replace environmentally damaging goods with environmentally 
friendly goods, even if this means a higher monetary cost. On the other hand, we find a 
stream of literature that finds a negative relationship between inequality and environmental 
quality. For example, Boyce (1994) contradicts the notion that affluent people favor 
environmentally friendly policies; on the contrary, he claims they favor environmentally 
damaging activities and, because inequality results in the concentration of political influence 
in the richest segment of society, they will oppose environmentally friendly policies. In a 
similar vein, Magnani (2000) argues that inequality means less power in the middle 
segments of society and this results in lower pressure for environmental protection.   
The empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality and environmental 
degradation is, to date, inconclusive. Contradictory results are to be found in such seminal 
studies as those by Torras and Boyce (1998), who find income inequality to be positively 
related to air pollution, and Ravallion, Heil and Jalan (2000), who find a negative 
relationship between inequality and carbon dioxide emissions. Subsequent studies on the 
relationship between income inequality and CO2 emissions sow further seeds of doubt. 
Thus, whereas Baek and Gweisah (2013) and Uzar and Eyuboglu (2019) find a positive 
relationship, Heerink, Mulatu and Bulte (2001) find a negative relationship. For their part, 
Liu, Yiang and Xie (2019) find that inequality increases CO2 emissions in the short term 
and reduces them in the long term, while Clément and Meunié (2010) find no significant 
relationship. Interestingly, Grunewald et al. (2017), in a study that distinguishes between 
low-, middle-, and high-income countries, find that in low- and middle-income economies 
inequality is negatively associated with CO2 emissions, while the opposite is the case in 
upper-middle and high-income economies, where greater inequality increases emissions.   
While there is a growing body of evidence on the relationship between social inequality and 
emission levels, the literature on the potential effects of income inequality is much rarer. 
More specifically, we are unaware of any previous empirical analysis of the effect of income 
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inequality on climate policies, as defined under the Paris Agreement.1 Here, to study how 
cross-country, as well as within-country, income inequality might shape the climate policy 
ambition of different countries, we draw on different inequality indices as we seek to 
capture how inequality (or which kinds of inequality) affects climate policy. Our results 
suggest that the lower the country’s income, as measured by GDP per capita, the greater is 
its ambition in the presence of external support. Within-country inequality, as measured by 
different indices, is associated with lower mitigation ambition. This relationship holds for 
low- and middle-low-income countries, but we find no significant relationship between 
inequality and mitigation ambition for high-income countries. 
 
2. The Paris Agreement and the (I)NDCs 
In December 2015, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) was held in Paris. Before this, the state 
parties had been invited to outline publicly their plans as of 2020 for addressing climate 
change, in what was known as their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). 
Subsequently, these plans were formally submitted to the Paris Agreement and ratified as 
the parties’ NDCs.   
Each State’s NDC lays out its commitment to achieve the long-term goals set out under 
the Paris Agreement, essentially, that is, to maintain the global temperature rise below 2 ºC, 
or ideally below 1.5 ºC (IPCC, 2018). However, it is well documented that these pledges 
have fallen short. Indeed, according to various studies (including, UNEP 2017, IEA 2016, 
CAT 2018), current NDCs put global temperatures on track to rise at 2.7–3.7 ºC over pre-
industrial levels over the next century (median chance).2  
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement adopts a bottom-up architecture. 
Thus, countries are free to set their mitigation targets and they are accountable for 
achieving them. However, as this is insufficient to reach the global target, every five years, a 
global stocktake (Article 14 of the Paris Agreement)3 is conducted during which the 
countries NDCs are assessed and, depending on the outcome, they are expected to update 
or enhance their targets. The First Global Stocktake is to be held in 2023 and is meant to 
result in revised NDCs by 2025.   
One of the main obstacles faced by the Paris architecture is the measurement and 
comparison of mitigation efforts across countries. The discretion afforded countries to 
determine their own mitigation efforts resulted in a variety of targets that are not always 
readily comparable: some of these targets refer to historical emission levels, while others 
refer to business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. Likewise, some express their targets as 
emissions per capita, while others refer to emissions per gross domestic product (GDP). 
These complications, together with many other assumptions in the countries’ NDCs, blur 
cross-country comparability, which in turn undermine perceptions of equity and make free-
riding more probable (Barrett 2003). For instance, while we know a country’s emission 
                                                          
1 Zimm and Nakicenovic (2019) analyze the implications of the Paris Agreement for inequality, but their 
analysis refers to inequality in the effort to control emissions, rather than to economic inequality. 
2 MIT https://www.wri.org/blog/2015/11/latest-climate-commitments-how-much-will-world-
warm-its-complicated  
3 Article 14 of the Paris Agreement provides for a periodic global stocktake “of the implementation 
of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this 
Agreement and its long-term goals”. This stocktake is to conducted in a “comprehensive and 
facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and 
support, and in the light of equity and the best available science”. 
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levels in 2030 based on the NDC it submitted, it tells us very little about the level of effort 
required of it, i.e. whether the country is excelling itself or free-riding on others. The long-
term success of the Agreement may well depend on just how this problem of comparability 
is addressed, that is, determining whether similar countries are actually making a 
comparable effort (Aldy and Pizer 2016; Aldy et al. 2016; Aldy et al. 2017). 
In this paper, we exploit the fact that countries were able to submit two types of NDC: a 
low-ambition and a high-ambition target. The former identifies the mitigation targets that a 
country plans to achieve using its own resources; the latter, in contrast, is more ambitious 
in reducing emissions albeit conditional on receiving external support, in the form of 
finance, technology or capacity building. The difference between the two gives us a sense 
of the additional effort a country is willing to make as it moves from its current 
circumstances (own means) to the most favorable circumstances (external support). Thus, 
we are specifically interested in disentangling which factors spur or block climate policy 
ambition, and, especially, in shedding light on the role played by inequality.    
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Climate policy ambition 
The (I)NDC data are taken from the Australian-German Climate and Energy College 
(Meinshausen and Alexander 2017), the only portal to date that provides a comprehensive 
overview of all the NDCs with the corresponding quantification of country’s planned 
emissions. For all countries, we have information about the levels of GHG emissions that 
they commit to in 2030. Some countries record two NDCs – corresponding to low/high 
ambition targets, while others record just one NDC – these tend to be the richer countries, 
whose NDCs are not dependent on external support (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Number of countries with one or two NDCs by World Bank categories income 
level (195 countries in total; 92 have two NDCs).  
Source: Own elaboration 
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The level of ambition expressed by some countries increases if they can count on external 
support. Figure 2 shows the expected growth rate in GHG emissions between 2015 and 
2030 associated with high- (Y axis) and low-ambition targets (X axis). Taking the levels of 
emission for 2015, some countries – those in the bottom-left quadrant – plan to reduce 
their emissions no matter what. Others – those in the top-right quadrant – and 
independent of external support, show an increase in their GHG emissions compared to 
emissions levels for 2015. Finally, the countries in the bottom-right quadrant will only 
reduce their level of emissions if external support is received. 
 
Figure 2. GHG emission growth rate 2015-2030 according to high and low ambition NDCs 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
On the basis of this, we might speculate that only the countries in the bottom-left show 
any real mitigation effort and that those in the top-right are free riding on the former. 
However, this would be naïve as country’s mitigation effort is considerably more complex 
than this. For example, a country may increase its annual emissions in 2030, yet the level it 
records may well imply a huge effort in terms of their own means.  
If we consider how far countries lie from the diagonal, a different story emerges from 
Figure 2. Countries on the diagonal are those that have submitted just one NDC and, 
hence their low- and high-ambition pledges are one and the same. In contrast, the further a 
country lies from the diagonal, the greater is the difference between its low- and high-
ambition pledges. For instance, the Republic of Congo (COG) reports it will increase its 
annual emissions rate by 0.9% in 2030 (compared to 2015 levels) if no external support is 
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received (low ambition). Yet, with external funding, it undertakes to reduce its 2030 
emission levels by -0.2% (compared to 2015 levels). Likewise, India (IND), with a similar 
GDP per capita to that of COG in 2015,  reports it will increase its emissions by 1.35% or, 
if external support is received, the increase will be 0.81% higher than the level recorded in 
2015. Which country is making a greater mitigation effort? The answer depends not only 
on the reference year – here 2015 – but on many other factors. Nevertheless, the difference 
in emissions between a country’s low- and high-ambition NDC is indicative of its 
mitigation possibilities and how much its ambition in domestic climate policy has to 
increase. For the sake of our argument, here, we assume that with infinite external funding, 
any country could achieve zero emissions. It is this (normalized) difference between high- 
and low-ambition NDCs that constitutes, therefore, our measure of climate policy 
ambition (CPA henceforth): 𝐶𝑃𝐴 =
𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2030 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠− 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2030 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2030 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
,  where 
CPA is a continuous variable bounded between 0 and 1. Following our previous example, 
CPA index for Congo is 0.58 and 0.22 for India.  
 
3.2 Between-country inequality and climate policy ambition 
Figure 3 plots the correlation between GDP per capita (2015) and the change (%) recorded 
in ambition in domestic climate policy when external support is received, this is our climate 
policy ambition index (CPA). According to Figure 3, the lower the country’s income, the 
greater is its ambition for change. In contrast, higher income countries, consistent with 
Figure 1, tend to present just one NDC, i.e. the difference between their NDCs is equal to 
zero. In this regard, between-country inequality may drive country’s climate policy 
ambition.  
 
Figure 3. Ambition change if external support (CPA index) to GDP per capita. 
 
AFG
ALB
DZA
AGO
ARG
ARM
AUS
AUTAZE BHR
BGD
BLR BEL
BEN
BTNBOL
BIH
BWABRA BG
BFA
BDI
CPV
KHM
CMR
CANCAF
TCD
CHL
CHN
COL
COM
COG
C ICIV HRV CYPZE
COD
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGYSLV
GNQ
EST
ETH
FJI
FINFRAGAB
GMB
GEO
DEU
GHA
GRC
GTM
GINGNB
GUY
HTI
HND
HUN
IND
IDN
IRN
IRQ
ISRITA
JAM
JPN
JOR KAZ
KEN
KGZ
LAO LVA
LBN
LSO
LBR
L Y LTU
MDG
MWI
MYS
MLI
MRT
MUS
MEX
MNG
MNE
MAR
MOZ MMR
NAM
NPL NLDNZLNIC
NER
NGA
OMN
PAK PAN
PNG
PRY
PER
PHL
POPRT KOR
MDA
ROU
RUS
RWA
SEN
SRBSLE VKSVN
ZAF
SSD ESP
LKA
SDN
SURSWZ SWE
TJK
THAMKD
TLS
TGO
TTO
TUN
TU
TKM
UGA
UKR GBR
TZA
URY
UZB
VNM
YEM
ZMB
ZWE
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
(L
o
w
 a
m
b
it
io
n
 N
D
C
 -
 H
ig
h
 a
m
b
it
io
n
 N
D
C
 )
 /
 l
o
w
 a
m
b
it
io
n
 N
D
C
0 1 2 3 4
ln(GDP per capita 2015)
7 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
A relevant question here is whether countries with just one NDC are exhibiting their 
lowest level of ambition or, on the contrary, their highest. If the former is the case, then, 
countries are unwilling to achieve further mitigation targets – not even with external 
support – so their climate policy ambition is at its lowest. On the other hand, if the sole 
NDC is closest to a country’s highest ambition target (perhaps, because it is a rich country), 
a zero difference in this instance is indicative –contrary to what we might have believed– of 
the highest ambition. For the sake of our argument, we assume countries with only one 
NDC, and hence with CPA index equal to zero, are performing their lowest ambition level. 
This we consider to be more sensible as a country NDC target is, at the end of the day, a 
compromise among different agents subject to their own budget constraints. 
 
3.3 Within-country inequality and climate policy ambition 
While the relationship between cross-country income inequality and climate policy 
ambition appears to be rather linear – lower  income leads to higher ambition levels if 
external funding is received – the role played by within-country inequality is less 
straightforward to address. Figure 4 plots the correlation between the change in climate 
policy ambition (CPA index) and the Gini index, showing a non-linear relationship; low-
inequality countries show low CPA, and so do high inequality countries.   
 
 
Figure 4. Ambition change if external support (CPA index) to Gini Index. 
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If we recap Simon Kuznets seminal work (Kuznets 1955)4 low levels of inequality are 
associated with either low income countries or high-income countries. Kuznets hypothesis 
is that as an economy grows, market forces tend first to increase inequality and then to 
decrease it. This being the case, to disentangle the role inequality plays in determining 
climate policy targets, it results paramount to take into account the associated income level. 
An equal society where most people is (equally) poor may deal with climate policy 
differently that a society in which most people is better-off.  
 
3.4 Econometric analysis  
In this paper, we estimate two basic econometric models, both using a cross-sectional 
sample for 2015, the year in which the Paris Agreement was signed. Our interest lies in 
examining statistical associations between within-country inequality and a country’s climate 
policy ambition as measured by means of its submitted NDC (the country’s projected 
emissions for 2030). In this regard, given the nature of our dependent variable, a panel data 
model would not be appropriate; however, this prevents us from eliminating unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries (Baltagi 2005) and, hence, omitted variable bias is a risk. 
As such, the econometric specifications presented here do not claim to describe any 
relationship of causality, rather they capture a simple statistical association in a between-
country framework which, in all circumstances, allows us to discuss the relationship 
between a country’s climate policy and its inequality.  
The first model is estimated by means of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and its 
econometric representation resembles a typical environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The 
second model, which is the paper’s main contribution, estimates the same specification, 
only that here the dependent variable is climate policy ambition (henceforth CPA) as 
measured by the relative difference between low- and high-ambition NDCs. Since this is 
bounded between 0 and 1, we use a probit model. The first of these two models allows us 
to revisit a cross-country EKC estimation (Dasgupta 2001; Grossman and Krueger 1991) 
with the inclusion of inequality indices (Ravallion, Heil, and Jalan 2000; Torras and Boyce 
1998). In the second model, in contrast, we make inferences as to how this inequality 
relates to a country’s CPA. 
EKC models show the relationship between economic development and environmental 
impact, here measured as GHG emissions per capita5. The main hypothesis tested in the 
EKC literature is whether this relationship follows an inverted-U shape: that is, as income 
rises, emissions increase up to a point at which they start to decline. This relationship was 
first observed by Grossman and Krueger (1993) who noted the resemblance with the 
seminal inverted U-shaped relationships between income inequality and development as 
described by Simon Kuznets (1955). The EKC is usually estimated using linear polynomial 
                                                          
4 In his seminal paper, Kuznets shows that as countries develop from agriculture-based economy to industrial 
and service-based economy, inequality first increases, then peaks and finally decreases. This is an inverted U-
shape relationship between income level and income inequality, a.k.a. Kuznets Curve. The curve is driven by 
technological progress, sectorial relocation and globalization. In early stages of development less people 
benefit from physical capital investment, and people start moving from agriculture to industry. In mature 
economies, expanded education, lower capital return, lower inter-sectorial productivity differences, and 
welfare state development push inequality down again. Recent research argue that the recent rise of inequality 
in rich economies can be explained by Kuznets waves hypothesis (Milanovic 2016). Figure A1 in the 
Appendix shows the Kuznets curve, in which a quadratic function resembles the Kuznets Curve in a cross 
country sample in 2015. 
5 See Dinda (2004) for a complete survey of the EKC hypothesis.  
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models including quadratic terms of income as explanatory variables6. If the coefficient 
associated with income is positive and significant while the quadratic term is negative and 
significant, the EKC hypothesis is not rejected and an inverted U-shape is found.  
The consensus in the literature is that three main forces drive this inverted U-shape: First, 
the scale effect by which economic growth has a negative environmental impact due to 
increased production and consumption. Second, the composition effect captures the 
change in environmental damage attributable to the compositional change in production of 
an economy as it grows richer – from an agriculture-based economy to an industrial 
manufacturing economy to a services-based economy. Finally, an induced technique effect 
occurs as richer countries become more aware of environmental crises and demand greater 
regulation, inducing cleaner technologies in their leading industries. Based on these 
considerations, we estimate equation (1) while adding an inequality index and its interaction 
with income among the explanatory variables.         
 
ln(𝑒𝑖) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑌𝑖) + 𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln(𝑌𝑖) 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
(1) 
 
The dependent variable ei is the GHG emissions per capita of country i in 2015 and Yi is 
GDP per capita (PPP, in thousands of constant international dollars). This variable 
captures the scale effect. Ii is an inequality index and, since income and inequality are 
expected to interact non-linearly (Kuznets 1955), an interaction is included7: inequality 
(income) effect on emissions is, therefore, expected to be different at different income 
(inequality) levels. For instance, the predicted change in emissions associated to inequality 
will be equal to β2+ β3(Y). AGRIi and INDi denote the respective shares of agriculture and 
industry in the GDP and account for the composition effect. Note that this specification 
allows us to check the hypothesis forwarded by Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla (2008) to 
the effect that the more important the industrial sector, the greater is the political pressure 
against environmentally friendly policies and the less the environmental damage mitigation. 
Furthermore, COALi is the share of electricity produced by coal and it approximates the 
induced technique effect. TRAi is a country’s trade openness: the more export (import) 
dependence, the more (less) the emissions, insofar as we are measuring production-based 
emissions (Peters and Hertwich 2008; Steen-Olsen et al 2016). Finally, URBi is the urban 
population share.   
 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑌𝑖) + 𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln(𝑌𝑖) 𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑅𝐵𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
(2) 
 
The second model, equation (2), shares the same specification in terms of explanatory 
variables. Its dependent variable, however, is CPA and the estimation method, as 
described, is a logistic function, insofar as the dependent variable is bounded between 0 
                                                          
6 See Aislanidis (2009) for a critical review of the econometric techniques used to observe the EKC. 
7 Because of this interaction, and the inclusion of EKC’s main driving forces (which are supposed 
to underpin the statistical significance of quadratic income), we do not include quadratic forms of 
income in the specification. These estimations with quadratic forms and main drivers, however, are 
provided in the appendixes for completeness. 
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and 1. Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the two 
econometric models. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
D(=1 if 2 NDCs) 195 0.47 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
Income group (WB categories) 195 2.82 1.04 1 2 3 4 4 
GHG per capita 2015, Gg CO2eq  192 7.07 9.15 0.64 2.12 4.31 8.37 77.95 
Low Ambition NDC. GHG per capita 2030 165 7.63 11.09 0 2.5 5 8.52 105 
High Ambition NDC. GHG per capita 2030 165 6.93 10.2 0 1.95 4.48 7.75 91 
GDP per capita 2015 (PPP, 1000 international $) 183 17.87 19.13 0.7 3.72 11.33 25.31 115.9 
Gini index 161 38.5 7.87 25 32.7 37.4 43.3 63 
Palma ratio 161 2.97 1.37 1.43 2.08 2.6 3.37 10.52 
Income share top 10% (%) 161 30.15 5.99 20.9 25.4 29.6 33.1 50.5 
Income share top 20% (%) 161 45.55 6.48 35 40.7 44.7 49 68.2 
Income share bottom 10% (%) 160 2.56 0.88 0.5 1.9 2.6 3.15 4.8 
Income share bottom 20% (%) 161 6.52 1.89 1 5.1 6.7 7.9 10.8 
Coal electricity production (% of total) 138 16.25 24.04 0 0 0.94 29.1 96.36 
Trade openess (% of GDP) 177 88.56 50.95 19.1 56.75 77.2 107.4 416.4 
Urban Population share 2015 (%) 192 57.78 23.27 12.08 39.33 57.58 77.19 100 
Agriculture, Forestry and fishing Value Added (% GDP) 182 11.07 11.01 0.03 2.6 7.16 16.71 58.65 
Industry (including construction) Value Added (% GDP) 184 25.21 11.16 2.07 17.69 24.27 30.3 61.36 
 
Given our interest in inequality, we use a set of different inequality indices. This not only 
ensures our findings are more robust, it also allows us to analyze different perspectives of 
inequality. The Gini index is the most widely used inequality index, given its simplicity and 
its connection with the Lorenz curve. Nonetheless, its drawbacks are also well known, 
most notably the fact that it is highly sensitive to transfers in the distributional mean when 
conducting comparisons (Palma 2011). The Palma ratio was developed to address this 
weakness and, hence, gives all the weight to the extremes. Yet, the index shares a high 
correlation with the Gini index (Cobham et al. 2015). The Palma ratio shows the ratio 
between the income share obtained by the top 10% of recipients and the income share 
received by the bottom 40%. It is based on the observation of an empirical regularity 
according to which middle-income groups (i.e. deciles 4 to 9) systematically receive 50% of 
the income share. This being the case, inequality depends on how the top and bottom 
deciles share the remaining 50% of the income pie not captured by the middle classes. The 
index is intuitive and has become very popular among academics and policy makers, alike8. 
Finally, the top income shares provide further details as to the distribution of wealth in this 
bracket and, subsequently, serves as a measure of the elites’ power (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2002). 
 
4. Results 
                                                          
8 In 2013, ninety economists and development experts, including Nobel prize winning economist 
Joseph Stiglitz, sent a letter to the UN Economic Development Panel to put inequality and poverty 
eradication among its top priorities in forthcoming meetings and strongly suggested using the 
Palma ratio. https://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/docs/Dr-Homi-Kharas.pdf  
11 
 
4.1 Cross-country EKC hypothesis in 2015 
Table 2 shows our estimate of the between-country model (equation 1) for 2015 historical 
emissions. Here, as expected, the level of income is positively associated with the level of 
GHG emissions (scale effect). Models (1) and (2) perform the EKC with the Gini index 
with and without quadratic income, respectively. Models (3) and (4) repeat these 
specifications with the addition of the remaining drivers. Only income and the share of coal 
in electricity production are significant in explaining between-country differences. 
Specifically, income elasticity ranges from 0.6 to 0.8 (that is, an increase of 1% in income is 
associated with an increase of 0.6-0.8% in per capita GHG emissions). Coal use in 
electricity production has a low elasticity, but the result is highly significant. No EKC 
inverted U-shape is found in this cross-country sample for 2015 and, as the adjusted R2 
shows, a greater part of the variance in GHG emissions is captured with the linear rather 
than with the non-linear model. The Gini index coefficient presents a positive sign but, as 
the rest of the drivers, is non-significant. 
 
TABLE 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES lnpc_ghg2015 lnpc_ghg2015 lnpc_ghg2015 lnpc_ghg2015 
          
ln(Y) 0.823*** 0.838*** 0.667*** 0.657* 
 
(0.199) (0.250) (0.241) (0.365) 
ln(Y)2 
 
-0.002 
 
0.001 
  
(0.027) 
 
(0.038) 
Gini 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) 
ln(Y) x I_gini -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
TRA 
  
0.000 0.000 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
COAL 
  
0.006*** 0.006*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) 
AGRI 
  
0.011 0.011 
   
(0.012) (0.013) 
IND 
  
0.008 0.008 
   
(0.006) (0.006) 
URB 
  
0.004 0.004 
   
(0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.427 -0.446 -0.655 -0.640 
 
(0.525) (0.526) (0.755) (0.928) 
     Observations 158 158 118 118 
R-squared 0.756 0.756 0.732 0.732 
Adj. R-Squared 0.751 0.749 0.712 0.709 
LL -88.54 -88.53 -61.86 -61.86 
F 181.1 137.7 46.26 42.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Given that income (GDP per capita) is found to be such a determinant factor, we split the 
sample between low-income (including, in terms of the World Bank classification, low 
income and middle-low income) and high-income countries (upper-middle income and 
high income). We use the linear model and include different inequality indices. Table 3 
shows that GDP p.c. only remains important in explaining cross-country differences in the 
case of low-income countries. Although the two groups present different signs, the 
inequality indices are non-significant. Interestingly, coal remains an important driver of 
emissions in high-income countries but not in low-income countries, for whom trade 
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openness is now a significant driver of emissions. Likewise, the industrial share of GDP 
becomes significant, with a different sign in the two groups. Thus, while in low-income 
countries the relevance of the industrial sector is negatively (and weakly) related to 
emissions, in high-income countries the opposite is the case so that the more important the 
industrial sector, the higher the level of emissions. 
TABLE 3 
  Low Income countries High Income countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
lnpc_ghg
2015 
lnpc_ghg
2015 
lnpc_ghg
2015 
lnpc_ghg2
015 
lnpc_ghg2
015 
lnpc_ghg2
015 
lnpc_ghg2
015 
lnpc_ghg
2015 
                  
ln(Y) 1.390** 1.924** 1.475** 0.913** 0.764 0.605 0.559 0.813*** 
 
(0.531) (0.916) (0.713) (0.341) (0.515) (0.682) (0.444) (0.246) 
highest10 0.022 
   
0.006 
   
 
(0.023) 
   
(0.050) 
   ln(Y) x I_highest10 -0.030* 
   
-0.002 
   
 
(0.017) 
   
(0.019) 
   I_highest20 
 
0.030 
  
  -0.007 
  
  
(0.030) 
  
  (0.044) 
  ln(Y) x I_highest20 
 
-0.032 
  
  0.002 
  
  
(0.020) 
  
  (0.016) 
  Gini 
  
0.027 
 
  
 
-0.012 
 
   
(0.027) 
 
  
 
(0.034) 
 ln(Y) x I_gini 
  
-0.026 
 
  
 
0.004 
 
   
(0.018) 
 
  
 
(0.012) 
 Palma 
   
0.154   
  
0.114 
    
(0.152)   
  
(0.253) 
ln(Y) x I_palma 
   
-0.145   
  
-0.041 
    
(0.103)   
  
(0.100) 
TRA 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
COAL 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
AGRI 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.034 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
IND -0.014 -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
URB 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.714 -1.421 -1.141 -0.554 -1.029 -0.590 -0.429 -1.202 
 
(1.161) (1.513) (1.172) (0.972) (1.463) (1.924) (1.295) (0.740) 
     
  
   Observations 43 43 43 43 75 75 75 75 
R-squared 0.511 0.511 0.508 0.496 0.550 0.550 0.551 0.552 
Adj. R-Squared 0.396 0.396 0.392 0.378 0.496 0.496 0.496 0.497 
LL -23.91 -23.89 -24.03 -24.55 -20.99 -20.99 -20.94 -20.87 
F 7.346 7.535 7.519 6.504 15.42 15.15 15.03 15.93 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The Chow test has traditionally been used in econometrics to identify structural breaks 
(Chow 1960). In program evaluation it is also used to determine whether intercepts and all 
coefficients are the same across groups, here high-income and low-income countries. It 
consists in an F statistic to test the equality of estimated parameters across different groups. 
To so do we interacted all explanatory variables with a dummy variable identifying the two 
groups (Wooldridge XXX).  The null hypothesis is that interacted variables are jointly equal 
to zero, i.e. no structural break. In all cases (models 1 to 8), the null hypothesis is rejected 
at 1% level (Table A2 in the Appendix), meaning that the relationship between income and 
GHG emissions is better captured by separating high and low-income countries.       
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4.2 Climate policy ambition 
As described above, countries freely opted to submit either one or two NDCs, the 
submission of a second NDC being related to a country’s commitment to make a greater 
effort to abate domestic emissions conditional on external support being received. In 
contrast, a single NDC is a country’s unconditional domestic abatement to be implemented 
with its own resources. The former, therefore, can be considered a high-ambition 
abatement target and the latter a low-ambition target. Table 4 shows a probit model in 
which the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a country opted to submit two NDCs, 
i.e. a low- and a high-ambition NDC.  
 
TABLE 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES D D D D 
          
ln(Y) -2.795*** -3.569*** -2.705*** -1.657*** 
 
(0.815) (1.165) (0.862) (0.494) 
highest10 -0.131** 
   
 
(0.056) 
   ln(Y) x I_highest10 0.065*** 
   
 
(0.024) 
   I_highest20 
 
-0.118** 
  
  
(0.058) 
  ln(Y) x I_highest20 
 
0.061** 
  
  
(0.024) 
  Gini 
  
-0.094* 
 
   
(0.049) 
 ln(Y) x I_gini 
  
0.049** 
 
   
(0.021) 
 Palma 
   
-0.545** 
    
(0.273) 
ln(Y) x I_palma 
   
0.273** 
    
(0.123) 
     TRA -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
COAL 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
AGRI -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) 
IND 0.037** 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
URB 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Constant 5.705** 7.113** 5.325** 3.453** 
 
(2.410) (3.142) (2.437) (1.735) 
     Observations 118 118 118 118 
pseudo R-squared 0.296 0.296 0.295 0.286 
LL -57.61 -57.55 -57.61 -58.42 
Wald chi2 42.58 42.58 43.37 42.54 
 
The higher a country’s income, the lower is the probability of that country submitting a 
conditional NDC. This makes sense in the framework of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in addressing climate change. Inequality indices are significant and negative 
in all specifications, indicating that, holding all other variables constant, greater inequality is 
related to a lower probability of submitting a conditional NDC. Trade openness and 
industrial share are the other two variables showing statistical significance.  
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Table 5 runs the same model specification but, in this instance, using our climate policy 
ambition index (CPA), which consists of the relative difference between low-ambition level 
and high-ambition level; 0 means the country is not willing to increase its abatement effort 
even with external funding, and close values to 1 means a country is willing to double its 
abatement effort if external support is available. Notice that the Gini index shows a lower 
significance compared to that of both the top income share and the Palma ratio, which 
could be indicative of the fact that distributional extremes are more relevant than middle 
incomes in this matter. A legitimate hypothesis here is that the elites might oppose 
environmental regulations insofar as they may benefit from higher emissions (Boyce 1994). 
This elite effect has also been documented by Acemoglu and Robinson (2002).  
 
TABLE 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CPA CPA CPA CPA 
          
ln(Y) -2.782*** -3.554*** -2.695*** -1.648*** 
 
(0.818) (1.171) (0.867) (0.496) 
highest10 -0.130** 
   
 
(0.057) 
   ln(Y) x I_highest10 0.065*** 
   
 
(0.024) 
   I_highest20 
 
-0.118** 
  
  
(0.058) 
  ln(Y) x I_highest20 
 
0.060** 
  
  
(0.024) 
  Gini 
  
-0.093* 
 
   
(0.049) 
 ln(Y) x I_gini 
  
0.049** 
 
   
(0.021) 
 Palma 
   
-0.542** 
    
(0.274) 
ln(Y) x I_palma 
   
0.271** 
    
(0.123) 
TRA -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
COAL 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
AGRI -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.029 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) 
IND 0.037** 0.038** 0.039** 0.039** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
URB 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Constant 5.671** 7.076** 5.301** 3.426** 
 
(2.419) (3.155) (2.446) (1.742) 
     Observations 116 116 116 116 
pseudo R-squared 0.283 0.284 0.283 0.273 
LL -57.59 -57.54 -57.60 -58.39 
Wald chi2 41.34 41.44 42.30 41.21 
 
 
Beyond issues of inequality, it is worth noting that we find that the willingness to make an 
additional abatement effort with external support is lower when the importance of trade is 
higher, a finding that is consistent with existing evidence. In contrast, countries in which 
industrial activity is more important are more willing to make an additional effort, contrary 
to the hypothesis forwarded by Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla (2008).     
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In order to see how these correlations are built, we once again split the sample between 
low- and high-income countries and run the same model (Table 6). According to the Chow 
test9, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no structural break (Table A2). Therefore, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that slope coefficients and intercepts are equal across models. 
Yet, interesting insights are provided. We find that inequality only remains as a negative 
driver of climate policy in the case of low-income countries. Based on this outcome, the 
elite effect would appear only to be present in lower-income countries, that is, a high 
concentration of income can be related to a low level of climate policy ambition. In high 
income countries, by contrast, inequality is non-significant. Indeed, according to the results 
in Table 6, the only factor that negatively affects climate policy ambition for these countries 
is trade. When we split this variable between the share of exports and imports, only exports 
are found to be significant and negative. If, as these results suggest, exports are a relevant 
factor for a rich country, a higher level of ambition may be considered to compromise its 
competitiveness.   
 
TABLE 6 
 
                                                          
9
 The Chow test for a non-linear model is calculated by means of a Likelihood Ratio test which is 
Chi2 under the null hypothesis (Andrews and Fair, 1988). 
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Regarding the effect of inequality on climate policy ambition, the main finding here is that 
its marginal effect depends upon the level of country’s GDP per capita (captured by the 
interaction effect); the higher the GDP per capita, the less negative is the inequality for 
climate policy (i.e. lower the elite effect). Figure 5 plots the predicted marginal effects of 
the (preferred) aggregate model (in Table 5) by median income in World Bank income 
categories. Poorest countries show a negative curve pointing to some sort of elite effect. 
Rich countries higher income, however, more than compensates the inequality negative 
coefficient, showing a positive relationship between inequality and climate policy ambition 
and hence potentially reflecting climate policy as a superior good.     
 
FIGURE 5. Predictive margins of Inequality by World Bank income categories 
(median income) 
  Low Income Countries High Income Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES CPA CPA CPA CPA CPA CPA CPA CPA 
                  
ln(Y) -5.238** -7.708** -5.310** -3.252*** -2.813 -3.510 -2.618 -1.460 
 
(2.229) (3.361) (2.455) (1.230) (2.362) (3.193) (2.234) (1.094) 
highest10 -0.191**    -0.149 
   
 
(0.086)    (0.218) 
   ln(Y) x I_highest10 0.142**    0.068 
   
 
(0.067)    (0.080) 
   I_highest20  -0.201**   
 
-0.130 
  
 
 (0.098)   
 
(0.195) 
  ln(Y) x I_highest20  0.148**   
 
0.060 
  
 
 (0.068)   
 
(0.071) 
  Gini   -0.156*  
  
-0.098 
 
 
  (0.085)  
  
(0.159) 
 ln(Y) x I_gini   0.113**  
  
0.046 
 
 
  (0.057)  
  
(0.057) 
 Palma    -1.038** 
   
-0.376 
 
   (0.435) 
   
(1.014) 
ln(Y) x I_palma    0.819** 
   
0.181 
 
   (0.345) 
   
(0.396) 
TRA 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
COAL 0.033** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
AGRI -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.022 
 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) 
IND -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.032 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
URB 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Constant 7.449** 10.902** 7.767* 4.768* 8.523 9.915 7.854 5.319 
 
(3.603) (5.271) (4.177) (2.449) (7.533) (9.789) (7.243) (4.129) 
 
    
    Observations 43 43 43 43 73 73 73 73 
pseudo R-squared 0.211 0.219 0.211 0.230 0.378 0.380 0.381 0.369 
LL -20.78 -20.59 -20.79 -20.29 -30.73 -30.63 -30.60 -31.18 
Wald chi2 14.23 14.65 13.74 15.76 29.43 29.81 30.36 30.91 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Predictive margins model (1) in Table 5 
 
5. Conclusion 
To date, the literature addressing the relationship between income inequality and 
environmental deterioration has provided diverse theoretical insights and inconclusive 
evidence. While there is a growing body of evidence on the relationship between social 
inequality and emissions, the literature on the potential effects of income inequality is much 
scarcer. In this study we have undertaken an empirical analysis of the effect of income 
inequality on climate policies as defined in the Paris Agreement.   
To study the effects of between-country, as well as within-country, income inequality on 
climate policy ambition we have used several inequality indexes in conjunction with data 
obtained from the Paris Agreement on the INDCs – both without and with external 
support – to fight climate change.  
Our results suggest that the lower the country’s income, as measured by GDP per capita, 
the greater is its level of ambition when external support is made available. Additionally, we 
find that within-country inequality is associated with lower mitigation ambition. This 
relationship holds for low- and middle-low-income countries, but we find no significant 
relationship between inequality and mitigation ambition for high-income countries. 
Our analysis does not allow us to establish any causal mechanisms via which income 
inequality translates into climate policy ambition, but various explanations might be 
offered: in low-income countries, inequality might concentrate greater political power in 
the hands of the elite, who benefit from polluting economic activities; or, as 
environmentally friendly policies have the characteristics of a superior good, more unequal 
societies might experience less political pressure from middle classes to engage in ambitious 
environmental policies. We believe that a promising avenue for future research is to analyze 
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whether the quality of democracy might be influencing the relationship between inequality 
and climate policy ambition. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Data sources and variable definition 
Variable Definition Data source 
D D(=1 if 2 NDCs) Meinshausen and Alexander (2017) 
Wbcat Income group (WB categories) WB data (2019) 
E GHG per capita 2015, Gg CO2eq  PIK. Gütschow et al. (2019) 
LowNDC Low Ambition NDC. GHG per capita 2030 Meinshausen and Alexander (2017) 
HighNDC High Ambition NDC. GHG per capita 2030 Meinshausen and Alexander (2017) 
Dif Ambition change (LowNDC- HighNDC)/lowNDC Meinshausen and Alexander (2017) 
Y GDP per capita 2015 (PPP, 1000 international $) WB data (2019) 
I_gini Gini index WB data (2019) 
I_palma Palma ratio WB data (2019) 
I_highest10 Income share top 10% (%) WB data (2019) 
I_highest20 Income share top 20% (%) WB data (2019) 
I_lowest10 Income share bottom 10% (%) WB data (2019) 
I_lowest20 Income share bottom 20% (%) WB data (2019) 
COAL Coal electricity production (% of total) WB data (2019) 
TRA Trade openness (% of GDP) WB data (2019) 
URB Urban Population share 2015 (%) WB data (2019) 
AGRI Agriculture, Forestry and fishing Value Added (% GDP) WB data (2019) 
IND Industry (including construction) Value Added (% GDP) WB data (2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Structural change test 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Dep. Var 
(Ineq. Index) 
lnpc_ghg2015 
( highest10%) 
lnpc_ghg2015 
(highest20%) 
lnpc_ghg2015 
(Gini Index) 
lnpc_ghg2015 
(Palma Ratio) 
Chow Test: 
F(9,100) [p>F] 4.12 [0.0002] 3.93 [0.0003] 3.75 [0.0004] 3.59 [0.0007] 
Model Dep. Var CPA CPA CPA CPA 
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(Ineq. Index) ( highest10%) (highest20%) (Gini Index) (Palma Ratio) 
Chow Test: 
LR [p>χ2] 12.16 [0.2045] 13.26[0.1513] 12.18 [0.2036] 12.83 [0.1706] 
Wald test [p>χ2] 10.40 [0.3191] 10.99[0.2765] 10.21 [0.3339] 11.09 [0.2698] 
 
Figure A1. Kuznets Curve. Cross-country 2015 
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